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This article considers how wholesale (also often called large-value)  
payment systems can be organised, how they have evolved over recent 
decades and what are the forces currently at play in shaping settlement 
mechanisms. The various risks that arise in large-value payment systems are 
identified and the two basic models of organising settlement – deferred net 
settlement and gross settlement – are explained. There has been a move away 
from the former type of settlement to the latter over time. Queuing and liquidity-
saving mechanisms are also now being used in system design so as to reduce 
risk and further improve efficiency in payments.
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1.  Introduction
In discussing payments and payment systems,  
a distinction is usually made between retail and 
wholesale payments with the principal differences 
between the two relating to transaction size – 
with the former involving relatively small value 
amounts and the latter relatively large value 
transfers – and the parties involved – typically 
non-banks making retail payments and banks 
engaging in wholesale payments. Both types  
of payment also bring with them a distinct set  
of issues that dominate discussion and policy 
formulation in that area. In wholesale payments,  
a key concern is the form in which settlement  
of payments takes place.
The purpose of this article is to examine how 
wholesale (also often called large-value) payment 
systems are organised, how they have evolved 
over recent decades and what are the forces 
currently at play in shaping settlement 
mechanisms. Most initiatives and innovations  
in payments are aimed at improving efficiency.  
In large-value payments, there is a particular 
emphasis on using them to reduce risks or to 
manage them better. Different forms of risk can 
arise in large-value payment systems but for the 
purpose of this article three key types of risk are 
highlighted.
The first is credit (or counterparty) risk, which  
is the risk that a counterparty to a payment will 
not settle an obligation for full value, either when 
due or at any time thereafter. The term credit risk 
ties in, or is associated, with risk types such as 
market or price risk (the risk of losses arising  
from movements in market prices), replacement 
risk (the risk that, owing to a counterparty to a 
transaction failing to meet its obligation on the 
settlement date, the other party may have to 
replace, at current market prices, the original 
transaction) and principal risk (the risk that the 
seller of a financial asset, such as currency, will 
deliver that asset but not receive payment, or that 
the buyer will pay but not take delivery).1 Credit 
risk has a temporal quality to it – some difficulty 
arises during the time between when a payment 
is agreed and when it falls due to be settled so 
that settlement does not take place as intended 
and may not occur in the future either.
A particular issue in foreign exchange systems  
is that the separate settlement legs of a foreign 
exchange transaction need to be synchronised  
in order to avoid the risk that a counterparty  
will fail before all payments are completed. It is 
particularly relevant when the exchanging banks 
operate in different time zones and when their 
trading hours may not overlap with one another. 
This form of risk is often termed “Herstatt risk” 
after a German bank which, in 1974, was closed 
down without it forwarding an amount of US 
dollars it had agreed to deliver against a quantity 
of Deutsche marks it had already received as  
part of that foreign exchange transaction.
The second risk type is liquidity risk. This shares 
with credit risk the characteristic that it is a risk 
that a counterparty will not settle an obligation in 
full when due. It differs from credit risk in that the 
counterparty intends to meet its obligations and 
can do so at some future time but cannot carry 
them out at the originally agreed time because  
it does not have sufficient funds (or liquidity)  
to hand.
Credit risk and liquidity risk pertain to the bilateral 
relationship that arises in settling a particular 
payment, i.e., between the payer and payee  
to that transaction.2 The third risk type, systemic 
risk, addresses how those bilateral party-based 
risks, if realised, can impact other payment 
system participants and the good functioning  
of the payment system as a whole. Systemic  
risk, then, is the risk that the inability of a 
participant to meet its obligations in a payment 
system will cause other participants to be unable 
to meet their obligations when due. It includes 
situations in which credit or liquidity problems for 
one or more participants create similar difficulties 
for other participants in the payment system and 
it also refers to the possibility of a chain reaction 
in an interlinked payment or settlement system 
(Emmons, 1997). Systemic risk, therefore, can be 
understood as encompassing both the possibility 
of system failures and of other events which have 
an adverse, if not calamitous, impact on payment 
systems’ performance.
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Historically, deferred net settlement was the  
norm in large-value payments systems. In recent 
decades, however, new settlement procedures 
have been adopted with the purpose, inter alia,  
of addressing the type of risks mentioned above. 
During the 1990s, gross settlement in real-time 
came to be adopted as the predominant 
settlement mode in large-value payments. 
Payments systems which combine elements  
of both gross and net settlement – so-called 
hybrid systems – are now feasible. In section 2, 
the concepts and basic models of deferred net 
settlement (DNS) and real-time gross settlement 
(RTGS) are outlined. Recent developments in 
payment systems, including variants on the basic 
settlement models, are considered in section 3. 
Section 4 concludes.
2.  Settlement options in large-
value payment systems
2.1  Methods of settlement in payments
Large-value, or wholesale, payments can be  
seen as involving two elements. One is the 
transfer of payment information between the 
payer and payee banks – termed “processing”  
– and the other is settlement – that is the actual 
transfer of funds between the banks. Central 
banks act, in effect, as the settlement agents 
between commercial banks in most payment 
systems. Discussions of large-value payment 
systems tend to focus on the settlement aspect 
of payments as real-time processing of payment 
messages is a feature of both DNS and RTGS. 
Large-value payments are usually settled by the 
transfer of deposits held at the central bank from 
one commercial bank to another. Banks face a 
choice as to when and how settlement occurs. 
DNS and RTGS represent two of the options 
available.
DNS recognises that commercial banks are  
able to reduce the amount of central bank 
deposits they need to settle payments if they 
agree to defer settling those payments between 
themselves for a period of time. Payment inflows 
and outflows can then be offset (“netted”) against 
one another over a period of time, such as the 
business day, and at a specified time, usually the 
end of each day, the net amount owed between 
any two banks is settled by a transfer of central 
bank deposits from the account of the net payer 
to the other bank. The phrase “deferred net 
settlement” then captures the essence of this 
settlement method: payments are settled on a 
deferred basis and the amount to be exchanged 
between any two banks is arrived at by netting  
off payments against one another, establishing  
an outstanding balance to be paid from one bank 
to the other. A simple example would be where 
Bank A has to make one payment to Bank B on  
a particular day with a value of €100 million while 
Bank B also happens to have one payment to 
make to Bank A, with a value of €70 million.  
In DNS, rather than Banks A and B making  
two separate settlements during the day, the 
payments are deferred for settlement until end-
day when the two payments are netted, or offset, 
against one another with a single settlement then 
occurring with Bank A forwarding funds to Bank 
B equal to the difference between the two 
payment amounts, i.e., €30 million. This principle 
can be extended to deal with many payments 
and can also be applied on a multilateral (i.e., 
multi-bank) basis.
This basic description of DNS highlights a 
fundamental tension or trade-off at work in 
settling large-value payments. In allowing 
settlement to be deferred until end-day, netting  
of payments against one another can be 
employed. This will, generally, reduce the amount 
of central bank money required to settle the daily 
volume of payments. Against that, in allowing a 
delay to occur between a payment obligation 
arising and its settlement, a credit risk arises  
as it is possible that payees will not receive  
the amounts owed to them.
This credit risk can be avoided by requiring 
individual payment obligations to be settled 
instantaneously as they arise, what is termed 
“real-time gross settlement” (the aforementioned 
RTGS). Under this method, each payment is 
settled on an individual basis, in which case there 
is no netting of payments against one another.  
By not allowing netting, payment by this method 
takes place in a gross settlement format and  
on a bilateral basis. While eliminating credit risk, 
the downside of this settlement method is that  
it does not permit the economisation on the use 
of settlement balances that netting can achieve.
DNS and RTGS can be seen as the basic, 
generic forms of settlement in large-value 
payment systems.3 In the remainder of this 
section, the basic models of DNS and RTGS  
are each considered more closely.
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2.2  Deferred net settlement
In DNS systems, settlement occurs at a discrete 
lag to the receipt of payment instructions. Banks 
do not exchange the total value of settlement 
amounts owed to one another but rather the net 
amount due between them, with the net debtor 
settling that amount by transferring deposits to 
the net creditor.
Payment messages are transmitted in real-time 
so that a participating bank’s net position can  
be calculated on a bilateral or multilateral basis 
during the business day. At a specified time, 
usually at the end of the business day, the net 
amount owed between the parties at that time  
is exchanged. Net settlement systems then 
involve a record of financial obligations developing 
over a pre-specified period of time at the end of 
which the net amounts of funds due to, or from, 
participants are transferred as appropriate.
The principal benefit of net settlement is that  
it allows banks to economise on their holdings  
of settlement balances, or at least reduce the 
immediate need for liquidity until the end of the 
business day when final settlement is made.  
To follow up on the earlier example involving 
payments between Bank A and Bank B, when 
the two payments are netted against each other, 
Bank A is only required to transfer €30 million  
in settlement balances to Bank B. If netting of 
these payments was not allowed, Bank A would 
have to access €100 million from its central bank 
settlement account, as opposed to the €30 
million it needs at end-day under the netting 
scheme. Bank B would also have to access  
€70 million of settlement balances to meet its 
payment to Bank A. Such an economisation  
on the amount of settlement balances required  
to meet payment obligations is typical of DNS 
and is one of its advantages. The fact that net 
settlement of transactions typically occurs at the 
end of the business day also means that there are 
no intraday calls on banks’ holding of settlement 
balances with the central bank. That settlement 
occurs at a specified time in the day can also aid 
banks’ funds management.
The downside to DNS is that the total value of 
payment commitments remaining outstanding  
at any time during the day can be quite large.  
In agreeing to wait until end-day to settle the  
net amount outstanding, Bank B, in the example 
above, is incurring the risk that the €30 million  
net amount owed to it will not be received.  
If individual payments were settled as they arose, 
this credit risk would not occur. In DNS, individual 
institutions are thus exposing themselves to the 
possibility of default on net amounts owing to 
them. This is the main weakness of DNS 
systems: credit risk arises in them. It also means 
that the system of payments is potentially under 
threat as a failure of, say, Bank A to pay Bank B 
the net amount owed to it can impair Bank B’s 
ability to meet its own net debts with respect to 
other banks.4
A number of measures can be introduced in  
DNS systems to manage credit risk. It is possible, 
for example, to put a quantitative limit on the net 
debit and/or net credit positions of banks. Such 
“caps” place a limit on the credit exposure which 
participants can run vis-a-vis each other. A 
payment will not enter the system when a cap 
could be breached by doing so. Loss-sharing 
rules, which indicate how losses arising from the 
default of a participant in the system are to be 
shared among the affected parties, are another 
means of addressing credit risk in DNS.
2.3  Real-time gross settlement
In contrast to DNS, RTGS involves final 
settlement of each individual payment being 
made at the same time as it is processed, that  
is at the time the instructions of the payer are 
transmitted to the central bank, so that the 
transaction can be considered to be settled in 
“real time”. In principle at least, RTGS systems 
see final settlement of interbank funds transfers 
occurring on a continuous, transaction-by-
transaction basis throughout the processing  
day. This form of settlement ensures that no 
credit risk arises.
RTGS, however, at least in its purest form, can 
place substantial liquidity demands on banks as 
they cannot reduce settlement amounts through 
netting. Referring again to the earlier example, 
under RTGS Bank A would have to draw down, 
or access, €100 million at the time of the day that 
Bank B forwarded its payment for settlement. 
Likewise, Bank B would have to provide €70 
million when its payment to Bank B fell due. 
Under DNS, in contrast, Bank A alone would 
have to provide settlement balances (of €30 
million) at end-day.
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Gridlock is a situation that can arise in RTGS 
systems. It occurs when a substantial number  
of payments in the system cannot be settled 
owing to one or more payers being unable to 
make outgoing payments. Those payers may  
be unable to settle those payments due to 
settlement rules or to a lack of funds or liquidity 
on their part. This, in turn, can have further effect 
on the payments system as their payees may 
have been dependent on the receipts from those 
payments to fund their own outgoing payments, 
and so on. In this way, an impediment to settling 
some payments can lead to a broadly-based  
or system-wide disruption to payments being 
settled. A number of variants on the basic  
RTGS model can help address gridlock;  
they are discussed in the next section.
Gross settlement procedures can be applied  
in foreign exchange. Such systems are often 
referred to as payment-versus-payment (PVP) 
systems.5 They involve a pair of financial transfers 
being made simultaneously in separate national 
RTGS systems and, therefore, being settled on a 
gross basis and with finality. Such a mechanism  
is a means of avoiding Herstatt risk as the final 
transfer of a payment in one currency takes place 
at the same time that the final transfer of a 
payment in another currency occurs.
3.  How modern large-value 
payment systems operate
3.1  The move to RTGS
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
(2005) identifies the 1990s as a period of major 
transformation in the design of large-value 
payment systems, with a move away from 
employing DNS systems to a widespread 
adoption of RTGS systems. The context in which 
this switch occurred involved a substantial rise in 
the volume of large-value payments, including a 
pickup in international payments flows.
This is illustrated in Charts 1 to 3, which focus  
on three major large-value payment systems.  
The US Fedwire system is the longest-lived of 
these. It saw payment volume rise by close to 
two-thirds between 1995 and 2009 (Chart 1), 
while payment value nearly tripled, in nominal 
terms, in the same period (Chart 2). TARGET is 
an interbank payment system for the real-time 
processing of cross-border transfers within the 
European Union. Data are available from 1999  
for this system and Charts 1 and 2 show large 
pickups in the volume and value of payments in 
TARGET over time. Payment value has increased 
as a proportion of GDP in both the Fedwire and 
TARGET payment systems since 2000 (Chart 3). 
CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement) is the third 
payment system whose payment volumes and 
values are shown in the charts. It permits foreign 
exchange settlement between major banks. It  
has been in operation since 2002 and, as can be 
seen from Charts 1 and 2, has seen substantial 
growth in both payment volume and value in its 
short history.
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(Data for charts sourced from BIS payment statistics website, 
December 2010).
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Nowadays, wholesale payment systems are open 
longer hours and, as Bech, Preisig and Soramaki 
(2008) point out, they process a considerable 
amount of relatively low-value payments. This has 
resulted in a greater volume and aggregate value 
of payments being settled in wholesale payment 
systems, as illustrated in Charts 1-3.
These developments in themselves render 
multilateral netting procedures, on which DNS 
systems depend, more difficult to operate and 
help explain the move to RTGS. The latter 
settlement type addresses specific risks that  
arise in large-value payment systems. The most 
important of these is systemic risk. RTGS’s 
appeal in reducing this type of risk was set out in  
a study by the Bank for International Settlements 
(1997): it removes the possibility of an unwinding 
of payments, which can be a source of systemic 
risk in net settlement systems, and it allows 
banks to process and settle payments throughout 
the day, which reduces the possibility of 
settlement pressures arising at particular points  
in time, such as at end-day. Adopting RTGS  
into payment systems, as occurred in the 1990s, 
then can be seen as an appropriate response  
to the need for sensible risk management in 
large-value payments systems, offering, as it 
does, a mechanism for limiting certain risks  
in the settlement process by effecting final 
settlement of payments on a real-time basis.
Central bank policies and some innovations in  
the area of large-value payments have aided 
RTGS’s viability and adoption. Leinonen and 
Soramaki (2005) indicate that a wide variety  
of system configurations can now be achieved  
to address specific types of transaction flows. 
These include many of the risk and liquidity 
management techniques used in RTGS  
systems (outlined below).
Central banks are heavily involved in the design 
and operation of payment systems. There are  
a number of reasons for why this is the case.  
As the Bank for International Settlements (2003) 
notes, most, if not all, interbank payment systems 
use the central bank as the settlement institution 
and central bank money as the settlement asset. 
These choices reflect the status of the central 
bank as a default-free settlement institution; the 
use of its settlement asset in itself helping to 
reduce systemic risk and liquidity needs through 
banks having to hold only one form of settlement 
asset; and the flexibility that the central bank has 
to determine the amount of that asset available 
for settlement purposes. Central banks are also 
likely to be cognizant of the social benefits of  
a smooth-functioning payment system and for 
this reason will most usually be proactive in 
endeavouring to minimise systemic disruptions.
The BIS study acknowledges that while central 
banks have long played an important role in 
payment systems, the widespread adoption of 
RTGS has required them to play a more proactive 
and leading role in payments. RTGS necessitates 
more central bank money being supplied for 
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settlement purposes than DNS, as netting of 
payments does not occur. The willingness and 
ability of central banks to support RTGS has 
allowed that settlement form come to the fore  
in large-value payment systems.
In the following two subsections, a number of 
RTGS-based settlement mechanisms employed 
in modern payment systems and the rationale 
behind them are discussed.
3.2  RTGS with intraday/daylight credit
Intraday credit (also termed daylight credit) is 
often provided by the central bank to system 
participants in RTGS systems. In a RTGS  
system with intraday credit, a payer bank might 
not have sufficient deposits at the central bank  
to meet a settlement obligation but payment  
can still take place by that bank drawing on an 
intraday credit facility at the central bank to meet 
any shortfall. Settlement then is achieved but a 
credit risk remains insofar as a liability arises 
between the payer bank and the central bank 
equal to the amount of intraday credit received. 
This might not represent a difficulty if payment 
flows throughout the day largely “even” each 
other out so that the intraday position of the 
banks is never too large, thus leaving them in a 
position to settle their outstanding positions with 
the central bank at a specified time towards the 
end of the day. There is, however, always the 
possibility that the intraday credit positions of 
banks may become quite large. This can be 
addressed by requiring banks availing of the 
intraday credit facility to post collateral or by 
placing a cap on the amount of daylight credit 
that they can receive.
Dhumale (2002) indicates that central banks 
provide intraday credit so as to avoid the effects 
of a liquidity shortage emerging in large-value 
payment systems. In granting intraday credit to 
banks, central banks are also aware of the credit 
risk they face but accept it on the basis of the 
impact that an insufficient amount of liquidity  
in the payment system could have on activity.  
In any case, central banks dictate the terms  
upon which intraday credit is provided to banks 
and this can reduce the credit risks they face. 
While an intraday credit facility could be provided 
at a zero charge, it is often priced (the US Federal 
Reserve, for example, charges a fee for intraday 
overdrafts) or credit might only be granted if 
collateralised by the borrower (as is the practice 
in the Eurosystem). Providing interest-free, 
uncollateralised intraday credit to commercial 
banks is not really an option for central banks  
as it would likely lead banks to manage their 
intraday flows of liquidity less effectively and 
possibly create a moral hazard problem  
whereby banks assume the central bank  
would bail them out if liquidity difficulties arise.
Cross-border collateral can be used by banks 
that operate in a number of national payment 
systems to secure intraday credit from central 
banks. Manning and Willison (2006) demonstrate 
that the amount of collateral that banks require  
in total can be reduced if they are allowed to use 
their collateral stock on a cross-national basis, 
provided liquidity needs are imperfectly correlated 
across the banking group.6
An alternative to collateralisation is to impose  
a charge on credit given to system participants. 
The main argument in favour of charging for 
intraday credit, as opposed to providing it without 
charge, is that it would encourage banks not to 
utilise that credit anymore than was necessary. 
Charging for intraday credit, however, can also 
have some less desirable effects. Manning and 
Willison (2006) point out that the actual cost of 
intraday credit may be an important consideration 
in determining whether a bank decides to 
participate directly or not in a RTGS system. 
Rochet (2005) shows that if a bank chooses  
to use bilateral agreements with other banks  
or makes payment flows through a competing 
DNS system in response to the pricing of  
daylight credit, the effective bypassing of the 
RTGS system may increase systemic risk.
Quantitative limits, or caps, on the amount of 
intraday credit granted can also be imposed  
by central banks. Kahn and Roberds (1999)  
put forward two reasons why caps on the  
amount of intraday credit extended to banks  
are desirable. Firstly, caps lower the incidence  
of default and, as a result, help reduce certain 
costs associated with default, such as legal 
costs. Secondly, imposing caps discourages 
excessive risk-taking on the part of payment 
system participants. Kahn and Roberds stress 
that it is important to set caps at the right level  
to ensure intraday credit is used as efficiently  
as possible.
Large-Value Payment System  
Design and Risk Management
ACTUAL PAGE: 84
6  The Correspondent Central Banking Model (CCBM) exists within the Eurosystem to allow the cross-border use of collateral  
to support Eurosystem credit operations or to obtain liquidity in TARGET, the Eurosystem’s large-value payment system. Quarterly Bulletin 01 / January 11
3.3  Queuing and liquidity-saving systems
A queued gross settlement procedure is another 
variant on the basic RTGS model that can help 
tackle liquidity issues. Should the payer bank not 
have sufficient funds with the central bank with 
which to settle a transaction as it arises then the 
payment is placed in a queue for settlement and 
only released and completed when the bank 
accumulates enough funds to permit settlement 
to be made. As McAndrews and Trundle (2001) 
point out, one beneficial effect of queuing then  
is that it does not give rise to settlement risk.
Centrally-located queuing arrangements  
can operate on a first-in, first-out (FIFO) rule. 
Alternative queuing arrangements are possible 
too. The queue of payments, for example,  
could be re-ordered to allow a “bypassing”  
of some payments by others to occur, perhaps  
in response to sending banks close to the front  
of the queue not having sufficient funds available  
to hand with which to settle particular payments 
while banks further down the queue are in a 
position to settle immediately. Contributing to  
the viability of queuing systems is that not all 
payments require instantaneous settlement,  
thus allowing banks some flexibility as to  
when payments are released for settlement  
and allowing them to be queued until sufficient 
liquid balances arise.
The concept of queuing has lent itself to the 
development of certain settlement procedures 
that can reduce the liquidity burden on banks  
in settling payments. Martin and McAndrews 
(2008) term those procedures “liquidity-saving 
mechanisms” (LSMs). They rely primarily on 
various queuing mechanisms for settling 
payments that condition the release of queued 
outgoing payments on the arrival of offsetting 
incoming payments. Liquidity is saved, or 
economised, in the following way. A payment  
is placed in a queue and only released for 
settlement when an incoming payment arrives. 
The two payments may be netted off against  
one another with the net balance outstanding 
settled immediately with a transfer of central  
bank money. This netting off of payments  
reduces the amount of liquidity required for 
settlement compared to an uncoordinated  
gross settlement procedure and in that way  
is “liquidity saving”.7
In practice, LSMs depend on computer 
algorithms searching payment queues to find 
offsetting payments. Those algorithms are 
capable of searching payment queues to find the 
largest subset of pending payments that can be 
settled and can do so while acknowledging and 
respecting banks’ views that specific payments 
must be settled first. Another example of how 
new information technology can be used to 
address settlement needs is where a transaction 
is “split” to reflect the amount of liquidity available 
for settlement being less than the full amount of 
the transaction. In this case, a portion of the 
transaction equating to the amount of available 
liquidity is settled with the benefit that the liquidity 
inflow to the recipient bank can be used to settle 
its own payment commitments.
Just as queuing can be used at system level  
to reduce liquidity needs, queuing within a bank 
can also take place. It involves banks sequencing 
their own incoming and outgoing transfers. This 
allows them to control intraday payment flows  
by arranging the timing of outgoing payments 
according to the amount of liquidity received from 
incoming payments. This scheduling can also be 
used to determine the preferred level of intraday 
liquidity held by the bank (as well as respecting 
any formal reserve requirements imposed on 
them) and its use of intraday/daylight credit. In 
principle, a successful sequencing of payment 
flows can reduce substantially the amount of 
liquidity required for payments for the bank in 
question.
It is, nevertheless, possible that what may prove 
beneficial for one bank could involve delaying 
settlement of some payment outflows and have  
a negative impact on liquidity management  
in payee banks. For such reasons, modern 
payment systems often put in place policies  
that encourage the processing and settlement  
of a certain proportion of a day’s payments by 
specified times. Faster settlement could also  
be achieved by a transaction pricing policy that 
makes earlier payments cheaper to execute. 
Throughput guidelines set by the payment system 
operator, requiring that a given fraction of the 
value of payments should be settled by a given 
time during the operating day, can also ensure 
early settlement and, according to Buckle and 
Campbell (2003), are a means of reducing 
aggregate liquidity requirements within the 
payment system.
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4.  Conclusion
Up to the 1990s, DNS was the prevailing 
settlement option in large-value payment 
systems. In the meantime, there has been a  
move away from this settlement method to 
RTGS. It is now becoming increasingly feasible  
to merge features of both DNS and RTGS in 
hybrid payment systems. This article has sought 
to review the means by which each of these 
settlement methods can address the various risks 
and other issues that arise in large-value payment 
activity.
The review emphasises that the main advantage 
RTGS has over DNS is that it effectively eliminates 
the credit risk that can be incurred in the payment 
process and, therefore, removes that particular 
risk as a threat to the good functioning of the 
payment system. Against that, a liquidity risk 
arises in RTGS – the potential that a commercial 
institution will be unable to meet its payment 
obligations as they come due because of an 
inability to liquidate assets or obtain adequate 
funding. Central banks are often required to take 
a role here by providing intraday credit to such 
institutions to enable them to settle payments.
This, in principle at least, exposes central banks 
to credit risk. Different policy options, however, 
exist to help central banks minimise that risk and 
to affect payment activity more generally. Central 
banks can require, for example, that any intraday 
credit provided by them is collateralised by the 
recipient bank. Innovations are also helping to 
reduce the amount of liquidity needed in large-
value payment systems. Leinonen and Soramaki 
(2005, p. 22) point out that while most large-value 
payment systems currently operated by central 
banks are RTGS systems, they tend to be 
acquiring an increasing number of liquidity-saving 
features over time.
It will be interesting to see how technology  
will interact with policy in the coming years in 
moulding large-value payment mechanisms.  
The distinction between large-value and small-
value payments may become redundant over 
time. A recent study by the World Bank (2008) 
indicates that some RTGS systems are already 
being designed to handle both payment sizes. It 
also argues that more national payment systems 
will use technological improvements to allow all 
payments, whether large or small, to be made  
on a RTGS basis. In itself, this could reduce 
considerably the quantity of large-value payments 
that need to be processed and settled as they  
are replaced by a greater number of smaller  
value payments. This could have positive 
consequences in reducing the risks inherent in 
payment activity and could influence policy. At the 
very least, it suggests that the future of payments 
will prove stimulating for all parties concerned.
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